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Abstract
In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of
the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers’ ra-
tionality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the dis-
agreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies—in
particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the
Conciliatory View—are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of
the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Stead-
fast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in
some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the
Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic
perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has
not been exhausted by the present paper.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to show that the problem of peer disagreement can
be analyzed from a game-theoretic perspective. The problem of peer dis-
agreement, as it is presented in the literature, is how to respond rationally
to the disagreement from an epistemic peer,1 whereby epistemic peer is con-
strued as an agent who has the same evidence and is comparably good at
evaluating that evidence.2 Game theory, in turn, is the study of strategic
decision making, where “strategic” means that the decision of one decision
maker may interact with that of another. This paper explains how the latter
can be used to analyze the former.
To do so, we focus on two prominent recommended strategies in the
literature about peer disagreement, namely the response advocated by the
Conciliatory View and the one suggested by the Steadfast View.3 On the
Conciliatory View, it can not be rational for an agent to stick to her opinion
when it is disputed by an epistemic peer. Instead, she should suspend judg-
ment (Feldman 2007), split the difference (Elga 2007), or at least migrate her
opinion significantly in the direction of her peer’s conflicting opinion. (Chris-
tensen 2007). According to the Steadfast View, on the other hand, it can be
rational for an agent to retain her opinion in the face of peer disagreement
(Kelly 2005, van Inwagen 2010).
The game-theoretic toolkit enables us to analyze the rationality of these
responses (strategies) for disagreeing peers (players), relative to these peers’
epistemic goals (preferences). In the literature on peer disagreement, the
epistemic goal or preference is commonly understood to be believing the
1See, for example, Kelly (2005, 167), Christensen (2009, 756), Elga (2007, 478), and
Feldman (2007, 201). For more papers about the issue, see the collection of papers in
Feldman and Warfield (2010), and Lackey and Christensen (2013), and papers cited below.
2For such construals of peerhood, see, for example, Kelly (2005, 170), Christensen
(2007, 188), Feldman (2007, 201), and Lackey (2008, 274).
3In the debate about peer disagreement, it is common to talk about “responses”,
whereas in the context of game theory “strategies” is conventional. In this paper, we
will use the two terms interchangeably.
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correct truth-value of the proposition under discussion.4 Thus, the rationality
of the available responses—i.e., the Conciliatory strategy and the Steadfast
strategy—can be analyzed by investigating to what extent they satisfy the
preferences (epistemic goals) of the disagreeing peers. In section 2 and 3
we will further explain the details of this game-theoretic approach to the
problem of peer disagreement. Section 4 discusses the results of this model,
section 5 considers some possible extensions or variations of the model, and
section 6 wraps up by emphasizing some key take-aways.
Why should such a game-theoretic analysis be a relevant contribution to
the debate about peer disagreement? Our motivation is that the resources of
game theory enable a clarification of the rationality of peer disagreement—in
particular, of the Conciliatory View and the Steadfast View—along an inde-
pendently motivated and well-developed standard. In the debate about peer
disagreement, it is not always clear how exactly rationality is understood,
what exactly counts as a peer, what a disagreement is, or even what the
Conciliatory View and the Steadfast View exactly amount to.5 A formaliza-
tion along the lines of game theory forces us to be precise about these notions
and disclose their exact specifications. And the fruit of such explicitness is
that it helps us to gain a better understanding of the exact specifications
and conditions under which a particular strategy (like the ones suggested by
the Conciliatory View and the Steadfast View) can be considered a rational
response to the disagreement from a peer.
We do not want to suggest that our game-theoretic model is the best,
let alone the only, way to make the machinery under the problem of peer
disagreement formally precise. Rather, our aim is to show that it can be
done. And we would welcome different or variant precisifications, as we
think that this would only help the debate.
4See, for example, Christensen (2007, 216), Feldman (2007, 212), Elga (2007, 488),
Kelly (2010, 17), and, even if only indirectly, White (2005, 450).
5This complaint is also expressed by, for example, Fitelson and Jehle (2009) Moss
(2011), and Lasonen-Aarnio (2013).
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2 The Peer Disagreement Game
We introduce our game-theoretic setup with the help of an informal example.
Imagine two detectives, call them Jane and Hercule, who both have been
asked to go to a crime scene to investigate whether φ, say, whether the butler
is the culprit. We make the following three assumptions about the detectives.
First, they have the same evidence at their disposal to investigate φ, namely
whatever traces are left at the crime scene. Second, the detectives can make
an informed estimation of how reliable each of them is in investigating φ,
based on their respective track-records; the number of crimes they have solved
in the past compared to the number of crimes they didn’t solve. Third, the
detectives really want to find out the truth regarding φ, they really want to
solve the case.6
So, Jane and Hercule both go to the crime scene, and spend some time
examining and evaluating the evidence. After some time, they meet up to
report their findings.
In the context of our “peer disagreement game”, two things can happen at
this point. Jane and Hercule can either have formed the same belief about φ,
or they can have formed conflicting beliefs and disagree about φ.7
If the detectives have reached the same conclusion about φ, say, they
agree that the butler is indeed the culprit, then there is no problem of peer
disagreement. The detectives can go write their reports. The case that we
are interested in, of course, is when the detectives have formed conflicting
opinions regarding φ; for example, when Jane believes that the detective
is the culprit and Hercule believes that the detective is innocent. And our
question is what, in such a case, a rational response for Jane and Hercule can
6We take it that the fulfilment of these three conditions is what is (at minimum)
required for the two detectives to be called each other’s peers, considering the construals
of peerhood by, for example, Kelly (2005, 175), Elga (2007, 484), Lackey (2008, 274), and
Christensen (2009, 757). The attribution of peerhood then depends on how equal the
detectives must be in their reliability. Our analysis accommodates this.
7In this paper we restrict ourselves to full belief states. An analysis that includes
degrees of belief is possible (see section 5), but we leave it to future work.
4
be, given their goal of finding out the truth about φ, and the information
they have about each other’s track-records.
Based on the debate about peer disagreement, we distinguish three strate-
gies that the detectives can play. The first comes from the Steadfast View
and is the strategy of staying with the initial belief. We call this strategy
Stay. The second strategy is the Conciliatory View’s recommendation to
suspend judgment.8 This strategy is called Suspend. And third, for the sake
of completeness, we include switching to the belief of the other detective as
a third possible strategy, called Switch.
So, after Jane and Hercule find out that they disagree about whether the
butler is the culprit, they can each play one of these three strategies. When,
say, Jane plays Suspend, she withdraws her initial belief about φ, goes back to
the crime scene to re-examine the evidence, and forms a new belief about φ.
But when Jane plays Stay, she chooses to ignore the disagreement from
Hercule and maintains her initial opinion, no matter what Hercule does.
And when Jane plays Switch, she chooses to ignore her own opinion and
takes over the belief of Hercule, regardless of what that belief is.9
The disagreement game ends when the two detectives reach an agreement
about φ. For example, when Jane believes that the butler did it, and Hercule
8Technically, the recommendation from the Conciliatory View can also be to split the
difference with the opponent (Elga 2007), or to revise one’s initial confidence level in the
proposition considerably (Christensen 2007). But since we restrict ourselves to full beliefs,
we take it that the Conciliatory View’s recommendation amounts to suspending judgment.
9So, naturally, only when a detective plays Suspend she gets a chance at forming a new
opinion. It might be objected that acquiring a new belief is not a necessary consequence of
suspending judgment. We agree. We think that it is in the spirit of suspending judgment,
in cases of peer disagreement (or other significant counterevidence), that judgment is
suspended only momentarily, as an act of caution, to re-examine the evidence and check
whether the initial opinion was correct. But, on another reading, one might say that
suspending judgment is meant for the long run, or at least until new evidence comes in,
precisely because forming any belief about the matter would be irrational. In this paper we
work with the first reading. But the second reading might be another welcome extension
of our analysis (see section 5).
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believes that he didn’t, and Jane plays Suspend and Hercule plays Stay.
Then the game ends when, after re-examining the evidence, Jane draws the
same conclusion as the conclusion that Hercule was holding on to, namely
that the butler is innocent. The same would happen when, for example, Jane
would play Stay and Hercule would play Switch. But the game continues
when, after playing their strategy, the two detectives still disagree about φ.
For example, when the detective playing Suspend forms a new belief about φ
that again conflicts with the conclusion of the other detective, then this
detective will again suspend judgment, re-examine the evidence, and come
back with a new belief.
For the purposes of this paper, we assume that the detectives do not
change strategies throughout the disagreement game.10 This means that the
game might also continue forever. For example, when Jane believes that the
butler is innocent and Hercule disagrees, and both detectives play Stay, then
they will never come to an agreement. The same thing happens when both
detectives play Switch.11
And now we are in a position to analyze how well these strategies do—
in particular, the Conciliatory strategy Suspend and the Steadfast strategy
Stay—in guiding each detective to the correct verdict on whether the butler
did it. Which of these strategies gives a detective the best prospects of
arriving at the truth?
Observe that which strategy is best is going to depend on two factors.
First, it depends on the track-record, the reliability of each of the two detec-
tives. For example, if Jane thinks that Hercule is way better at evaluating
10The reason is that this allows a straightforward comparison of the Conciliatory View,
which recommends playing Suspend for all instances of peer disagreement, and the Stead-
fast View, according to which playing Stay can be rational. It would be an interesting
extension of our model to allow players to change their strategy during the game (see
section 5).
11That under these strategies the game continues forever doesn’t make an evaluation of
the rationality of these strategies impossible. For in both cases we can still evaluate how
well these strategies do with respect to tracking the truth.
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correctly whether the butler did it, then it would be ill-advised for her to
play Stay upon finding out that Hercule disagrees with her initial assess-
ment. But when Jane thinks that she is far more reliable than Hercule, then
playing Stay is quite sensible.
Second, which strategy is best depends also on the strategy of the other
player. For example, when Hercule plays Stay, then it does not really matter
for Jane whether she plays Suspend or Switch, because either way the game
will end when Jane takes over the conclusion of Hercule. But when Hercule
plays Switch, it does matter whether Jane plays Suspend or Switch, because
playing Switch will bring them in a state of perpetual disagreement, whereas
playing Suspend will make them agree eventually. We will return to these
points in section 4.
So, we are going to analyze when a strategy played by a detective—
say, the Conciliatory Suspend, or the Steadfast Stay—is the best possible
strategy to arrive at the truth about the butler, when taking into account
the strategy played by the other detective, as well as the detective’s own
reliability and the reliability of the other detective.
This concludes our informal description of the peer disagreement game.
In the next section we will provide the formal vocabulary, and then analyze
this game.
3 Rationality for Jane and Hercule
Whenever Jane and Hercule investigate the evidence, they may conclude that
the butler did it (φ) or that he did not do it (¬φ). One of these conclusions
is true and one is false.
We will denote by p and q the reliability or truth-sensitivity of Jane and
Hercule, respectively. Thus p is the probability, on any given investigation,
that Jane draws a true conclusion from the evidence. 1 − p denotes the
probability of a false belief. So if the butler really did it Jane believes that he
did it with probability p and believes in his innocence with probability 1−p.
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Whereas if he is innocent she believes in his innocence with probability p
and believes that he did it with probability 1− p. Hercule’s probabilities of
drawing a true or a false conclusion from the evidence are denoted by q and
1− q, respectively.12
We choose to model “the probability of generating a true or false belief”
rather than “the probability of generating a belief for or against φ” because
we have evidence for the former but not the latter based on the respective
track-records of the two detectives. We assumed at the start of section 2 that
this track-record information is known to the two detectives.
In the epistemology of peer disagreement—as we learn from, for example,
Christensen (2007, 216), Feldman (2007, 212), Elga (2007, 488), and Kelly
(2010, 17)—the objective of rational conduct is commonly understood to be
believing the correct truth-value. This suggests the following epistemic norm.
Truth Norm (TN). Having a true belief is more valuable than having a
false belief.
We assume that Jane and Hercule share this noble goal, and that in fact
obtaining a true belief about whether the butler did it is their only goal.13
So the two detectives are not distracted by pragmatic concerns. This is
a methodological, not a substantive assumption: we are interested in the
epistemology of peer disagreement, not its pragmatics.
Then we can easily model their preference over outcomes of the disagree-
ment game: Jane prefers an outcome in which she has a true belief about
the butler’s guilt over one in which she has a false belief, and likewise for
12To avoid trivial cases, we assume that 0 < p < 1 and 0 < q < 1. We assume that,
if Jane or Hercule suspends judgment in response to disagreement, their new opinion is
generated with the same probabilities as their initial opinion (so Jane believes correctly
with probability p, and Hercule believes correctly with probability q). We also assume
that each time an opinion is generated this is done independently (in the probabilistic
sense) from the detective’s previous opinions and the other detective’s current or previous
opinions.
13We recognize that one might have other epistemic goals than truth. We will discuss
this in section 5.
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Hercule.14 A detective receives utility 1 if his/her belief about the guilt or
innocence of the butler at the end of the disagreement game is true, and
utility 0 if it is false.15
The expected utility of a detective in the game is then simply the prob-
ability of ending the game with a true belief. So Jane and Hercule prefer
a strategy if it increases their probability of ending the disagreement game
with a true belief concerning φ.
We can now determine the probabilities of ending the disagreement game
with a true belief for each combination of strategies of the two players (a
combination of strategies is called a strategy profile).
If both detectives play Stay, they never change their mind in response
to disagreement, so their probability of ending with a true belief is simply
the probability that they obtain a true belief initially: p for Jane and q for
Hercule. In all other cases the probability of ending the disagreement game
with a true belief is the same for both detectives. These probabilities are
indicated in table 1. The rows of table 1 indicate Jane’s choice of strategy,
and the columns indicate Hercule’s choice.16
14Note that under our interpretation of (TN) players care only about the truth of their
own belief. Results concerning a variation of our model where players also care about the
truth of the other player’s belief are available from the authors upon request.
15The introduction of utilities here adds nothing over and above the informal statement
in the previous sentence. In particular the numbers 0 and 1 are arbitrary: all that matters
is that a true belief yields a higher utility.
16This completes our specification of the game. Formally, a game is a triple
(N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ), where N is the set of players, Si the set of strategies available
to player i, and ui the utility function for player i, which assigns real-valued utility to
each strategy profile. In our case there are two players: N = {Jane, Hercule}; the strat-
egy sets for both players are identical: SJane = SHercule = {Stay, Suspend, Switch}; and
the utility for each player on each strategy profile is as in table 1.
The utilities are determined using the description of the disagreement game given in
section 2. For example, if both detectives play Suspend they will generate new beliefs
repeatedly until the first time they agree. The probability that they both generate a belief
that φ is true is pq and the probability that they agree that φ is false is (1 − p)(1 − q).
So the probability that they end the game with a correct belief about φ is the probability
that, on the first round on which they agree, they agree that φ is true rather than that φ
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Stay Suspend Switch
Stay (p, q) p p
Suspend q pq
pq+(1−p)(1−q)
p(1−(1−p)(1−q))
1−p(1−p)
Switch q q(1−(1−p)(1−q))1−q(1−q) pq
Table 1: Expected utilities associated with each strategy profile under (TN).
How can the detectives maximize their probability of ending the disagree-
ment game with a true belief, given that the choice of strategy of the other
detective influences his or her probability of attaining true belief, but they
cannot control it? Game theorists have invented various concepts of ratio-
nality in a game to deal with this problem. We will use the notion of Nash
equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium is a profile—that is, an assignment of a strategy to
each player—in which either player’s strategy is a best response to the other’s.
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium, no player can get an outcome she
prefers over the equilibrium outcome by unilaterally changing her strategy.
In our game this means that in a Nash equilibrium Jane and Hercule are
maximizing their respective probabilities of ending the game with a true
belief, given (that is, keeping fixed) the other detective’s strategy. This is
how we interpret (epistemic) rationality for Jane and Hercule.17
is false. This probability is simply pq divided by pq + (1− p)(1− q).
17Our model is thus different from other game-theoretic models that deal with infor-
mation and disagreement, notably Aumann (1976). There are at least three important
differences. First, there is an iterated exchange of opinions rather than common knowl-
edge of posteriors, although Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) show how Aumann’s
result may be reinterpreted in an iterative context. Second, we work with full belief states
rather than degrees of belief. Third, we allow players to choose a strategy for updating
their beliefs, rather than assuming Bayesian updating. We do not wish to argue that
our assumptions necessarily yield a better model of peer disagreement, in fact we would
welcome a comparison of our model with Aumann’s in terms of their consequences for the
peer disagreement debate.
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4 Results and Discussion
What are the Nash equilibria of this game?18 This turns out to depend on the
values of p and q. Figure 1 shows which strategy profiles are Nash equilibria
for any combination of values of p and q.
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Stay,Switch)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Stay)
(Stay,Suspend) &
(Suspend,Switch)
(Suspend,Stay) &
(Switch,Suspend)
(Switch,Suspend)
(Suspend,Switch)
(Suspend,Suspend)
(Stay,Stay)
0
1
2
1
p
1
2
1
q
Figure 1: Nash equilibria of the peer disagreement game as a function of the
truth-sensitivity of the detectives. E.g., if p = 0.4 and q = 0.9 then the Nash
equilibria of the game are (Suspend,Stay) and (Switch,Suspend).
Recall that we noted in section 2 that two factors would influence which
strategy choice is best. First, the reliability of the two detectives (modeled
as p and q) and second, the strategy of the other detective. Both of these
factors are shown clearly in our results in figure 1.
18We consider only pure strategy equilibria.
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The values of p and q clearly influence which strategy profiles are ra-
tional. For example, (Stay,Switch) is a Nash equilibrium whenever q ≤
min{p, 1 − p}, but not otherwise. Similarly, (Switch,Stay) is a Nash equi-
librium whenever p ≤ q ≤ 1− p, but not otherwise.
The other detective’s strategy also clearly influences what it is rational
for a detective to do. For example, if 1 − p ≤ q ≤ 1/2 the Nash equilibria
are (Stay,Suspend) and (Suspend,Switch). So under these circumstances, if
Hercule chooses the strategy Suspend, it is rational for Jane to choose Stay,
but if Hercule chooses Switch, it is rational for Jane to choose Suspend.
The epistemic success of the two detectives (both in terms of which strat-
egy promises the best probability of a true belief, and in terms of the value
of that probability) thus depends heavily on the choices made by the other
detective. In this way the epistemology of this model is truly social.
Of particular interest in evaluating the results in figure 1 are the profiles
(Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend). This is because the former captures
most directly the Steadfast View — according to which it can be rational to
Stay in a case of peer disagreement — and the latter captures most directly
the Conciliatory View — according to which the only rational option is to
Suspend.
Perhaps surprisingly, both (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) turn out
to constitute Nash equilibria, under some conditions even both at once.
As we can see from figure 1, the Steadfast profile (Stay,Stay) is a Nash
equilibrium when Jane and Hercule are each other’s equals in terms of how
truth-sensitive their beliefs are (i.e., p = q). In such a case neither would gain
anything by playing Suspend or Switch (provided the other player continues
to play Stay). More precisely, when p = q, the probability that a detective
ends up with a true belief by staying with his or her initial opinion is just
as high as the probability that the opinion of the other detective or a newly
generated opinion is true.
However, a mutual Conciliatory approach, as expressed in the strategy
profile (Suspend,Suspend), can also be a Nash equilibrium. This happens
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when p and q are both greater than 1/2 and are relatively close to each other
(see figure 1).19 When both detectives are relatively good learners, and they
find out that they have formed conflicting beliefs, they stand to gain more
when they both suspend judgment and acquire a new belief, than when they
stick to their initial beliefs, or switch to the other detective’s belief.
An especially interesting scenario occurs whenever p and q are exactly
equal and greater than 1/2: then (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) are
Nash equilibria at the same time. Under the definition of rationality we
use, in such a case both Steadfast and Conciliatory strategies are rational.
However, we offer three reasons to think that the Conciliatory strategy should
be preferred (without necessarily endorsing these reasons as decisive).
First, whenever (Stay,Stay) and (Suspend,Suspend) are Nash equilibria
simultaneously, (Suspend,Suspend) offers a higher utility (a higher probabil-
ity of solving the case correctly) to both detectives.20 In fact, (Suspend,Suspend)
is Pareto efficient. So Jane and Hercule prefer to play (Suspend,Suspend)
over (Stay,Stay). If they are allowed to discuss their strategy before the
game starts, we should expect both detectives to play Suspend.
Second, Suspend is a weakly dominant strategy (for both detectives),
while Stay is not. This means that playing Suspend pays off at least as well
as playing Stay or Switch, regardless of what strategy the other detective
chooses. So in this situation, playing Stay is only best for a detective who is
absolutely certain that the other detective is playing Stay as well (and even
then playing Suspend is equally good), whereas if there is only the slightest
uncertainty about what the other detective is going to do, Suspend is the
uniquely best strategy.
Third, we can see in figure 1 that when p and q are both greater than 1/2
there is a significant area in which the profile (Suspend,Suspend) is a Nash
19More precisely, the region where (Suspend,Suspend) is a Nash equilibrium is char-
acterized by the inequality p−
√
p(1−p)
2p−1 ≤ q ≤ p
2
1−2p(1−p) (although the first expression is
undefined when p = 1/2, the point p = q = 1/2 is also part of this region).
20Whenever p = q > 1/2, it must also be the case that p
2
p2+(1−p)2 > p.
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equilibrium, while (Stay,Stay) is a Nash equilibrium only when p and q are
exactly equal. This means that the strategy Suspend has a larger margin for
error than the strategy Stay. If Jane and Hercule lack precise information
about each other’s truth-sensitivity (as is reasonable to expect), playing Stay
is “riskier” than playing Suspend because the former requires exact and the
latter only approximate equality of the player’s truth-sensitivities.
To sum up, a surprising result of this model is that if the detectives are
both good learners, and the one is not significantly better than the other,
then both the Steadfast strategy and the Conciliatory strategy can be Nash
equilibria. However, we have noted three reasons to think that in such cases
the Conciliatory strategy should be preferred.
5 Limitations and Extensions of our Analysis
We have limited our analysis to a particular game-theoretic formalization of
a particular disagreement game between two detectives, Jane and Hercule.
To what extent does our analysis generalize to other peer disagreements?
And what are possible variations or extensions of our formalization?
Regarding the first question, our analysis applies to peer disagreements in
general insofar as they satisfy the assumptions of our model. In particular, (1)
peers are cashed out in terms of comparable reliability or truth-sensitivity, (2)
the possible responses available to the peers are something like the strategies
Stay, Suspend, and Switch as we model them, and (3) the rationality of a
particular response is evaluated in terms of how well it tracks the truth.
Regarding the second question, there are many options for different peer
disagreement games. Let us give six variables that can be filled in differently.
First, doxastic attitudes: in our model, strategies act on full belief states,
mainly for reasons of simplicity, but strategies might also be interpreted as
adjusting degrees of belief.
Second, we forced our detectives to generate a new belief whenever they
suspend judgment on φ. A variation of our model might allow peers to
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persist in a state of suspension. This outcome could be assigned its own
value, presumably worse than having a true belief but better than having a
false belief.
Third, we kept the peers’ strategies fixed throughout the game. The
reason for this was to enable an evaluation of the Conciliatory and Steadfast
strategies. But it is of course an idealization. So it would be an interesting
extension of the game to allow peers to change their strategies during the
game.
Similarly, we assumed that the game might go on indefinitely. This is not
very realistic. In real life there are time and energy constraints. So another
possible extension would be to let the game continue for a limited number of
rounds, after which the agents must have made up their minds.
Fifth, in our analysis the rationality of a strategy was evaluated using
Nash equilibria. Although this is very natural in game theory, it has sub-
stantive normative implications. So one may want to consider alternatives.
Available alternatives include various refinements of the notion of equilib-
rium, such as the trembling hand equilibrium, and alternative standards,
such as weak dominance. Different strategies may turn out to be rational
under such different standards of rationality.
Finally, we worked with only one epistemic norm, namely truth. But there
are more epistemic goals. For example, many philosophers of science have
argued, under the label of “epistemic diversity”, that maintaining diversity
of opinion can have epistemic value to a population of scientists, stimulating
new ideas and discoveries (Feyerabend 1975, Kitcher 1990, Zollman 2010).
Similarly, the literature on epistemic rationality has identified a trade-off be-
tween truth and information (Levi 1967). For example, true beliefs could be
maximized by believing only tautologies, but this is not informative. Either
of these considerations could motivate augmenting or replacing (TN) with
different norms.
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6 Conclusion
By way of conclusion we would like to emphasize four lessons that can be
drawn from our preliminary game-theoretic investigation of the epistemology
of peer disagreement.
First, in our model the Steadfast and Conciliatory Views were sometimes
both right: there were circumstances in which both staying with your own
opinion and suspending belief were rational. The idea that staying and sus-
pending can be rational simultaneously is underexplored in the literature and
worth investigating more extensively.
Second, the rationality of a response to peer disagreement may depend on
the truth-sensitivity of the peers. Both the peers’ relative truth-sensitivity
(who is a better learner and by how much?) and their absolute truth-
sensitivity (are they better than chance, say, or some other objective thresh-
old?) can make a difference.
Third, what is rational for a peer to do (e.g., whether to be Steadfast or
Conciliatory) may depend on what the other peer is doing. This is a natural
conclusion to draw in the game-theoretic context, but underexplored in the
peer disagreement literature.
Fourth, analysis of other game-theoretic models of peer disagreement may
shed more light on the above three points and other important questions
about peer disagreement. We encourage anyone interested in our model
(especially if they liked it but for one or two assumptions) to develop and
analyze such an alternative game-theoretic model of peer disagreement. We
hope to have provided a fruitful framework within with such further models
can be developed.
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